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passing through France. 4 The surveying expedition was one of a number of projects involved in what Albert Mathiez called the "scientifi c mobilization of the savants" 5 on behalf of the new nation-state.
Charles Coulston Gillispie has recently argued that during the French Revolution "the density of the intersections [between science and state] increased to a degree that is characteristic of modern polity in general" 6 -that is, a characteristically "modern" relationship between science and state emerged in new national states in the wake of the revolutionary proclamation of the sovereign nation. 7 Nehru's strategy of combining political leadership with the management of science in the emerging Indian national state thus had venerable origins, dating back to the emergence of modern nation-states in the Enlightenment West.
Nehru and his French predecessors all believed that a scientifi c approach was crucial to the kind of revolution they were trying to create; science would teach citizens to be sovereign and would draw them into a close relationship with their new state. Frenchmen of the late eighteenth century built on the Enlightenment conviction that the institution of the state had to be brought into line with the basic rationality of the human mind; science was the means to make the French state conform most closely to human reason. Nehru, in contrast, understood himself to be following a model established by modernization in an array of European and American states. 8 To be a nation-state, India needed science along with a middle class, an industrial economy, a national education system, representative government, a press-all elements taken from the example of Western modernization. Both nations saw science as catalyzing other necessary developments. Moreover, in turbulent early national times, both India and France could make science happen by creating national bodies such as institutes and public commissions. Other, more complex social developments-such as dechristianization of the peasantry or the formation of a middle class-proved beyond the immediate reach of the early national state. Leaders of both states, however, believed that scientifi c institutions would create a scientifi c public, which in turn 4 Ibid., 92-94. 5 Albert Mathiez, quoted by Jean Dhombres and Nicole Dhombres, Naissance d'un pouvoir: Sciences et savants en France (1793 France ( -1824 (Paris, 1989) , 47. See also Patrice Bret, L'Etat, l'armée, la science: L'invention de la recherche publique en France (1793 France ( -1830 (Rennes, France, 2002) , chap. 2. 6 Charles Coulston Gillispie, Science and Polity in France: The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Years (Princeton, N.J., 2004), 1.
would effect necessary future transformations such as the full realization of human rational potential and the creation of a middle class.
The authors of the essays collected here similarly make the case for science in the creation of national identity. With examples drawn from a variety of Eastern and Western nation-states, they argue that scientifi c ability became a marker of national character. The volume explores the ways in which modern science and the nationstate grew up together, each fully aware of the other's capabilities and prepared to use them. The Enlightenment was the moment when a mathematized modern science and the bureaucratized national state joined forces. 9 The fi rst states to take advantage of the power this nexus produced became globally dominant and were widely imitated. In this collection, we trace the Western origins of the relationship between science and the nation-state as well as the dissemination and adaptation of that relationship in the postcolonial world.
In these chapters, nations celebrate their modernity by displaying their scientifi c prowess. Since the groundbreaking publication of Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger's The Invention of Tradition, research on national identity has focused on nations' putative relationships with the past. The Invention of Tradition argued that national legitimacy was anchored in a continuous relationship with the past and that the continuity of that relationship was often fabricated wholesale. Nationalism, Hobsbawm argues, was "so unprecedented that . . . historic continuity had to be invented." Scholars following this lead have focused on uncovering that process of invention. 10 Although the essays in this book do not obviate these previous claims, they do present a parallel discourse of national identity rooted in modernity and oriented toward the future rather than toward the past. 11 These essays locate national identity in the conjunction of modern professional science, state sponsorship, and an engaged citizenry. They echo Ernest Renan, who in "What is a Nation?" asserted that nations look forward as well as backward. In addition to the "glorious heritage" of their past, they need "a shared program to implement" in a common future. The national imaginary often defi nes that future in terms of scientifi c and technological achievement. 12 As nations cultivate the camoufl age of ancient tradition, they simultaneously celebrate their scientifi c character, which they present as unprecedented. The unique achievement of the nation, they maintain, lies in its citizens' scientifi c competence, their position on the cutting edge of discovery. We argue, then, that national identity is rooted in a tradition of invention as well as in the invention of tradition.
When nationalists proclaimed this tradition of invention, they construed science broadly; their notions of science included, among other subjects, medicine, engineering, technology, and public health. Science in these contexts meant a rational, universal understanding as well as an approach to problem solving that would leverage the physical world and control nature for human benefi t. Thus, when Nehru or the French revolutionaries appealed to "science," they referred to a common intellectual and political enterprise, even though their conceptions of science obviously lacked common 9 Wise, introduction (cit. n. 7), 5-6. 10 Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," in The Invention of Tradition, 2nd ed., ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1983; repr., New York, 2000) , 7.
11 Konstantinos Chatzis, "Introduction: The National Identities of Engineers," Hist. & Tech. 23 (2007): 194. 12 Ernest Renan, "What Is a Nation?" in Becoming National, ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, trans. Martin Thom (New York, 1996) , 41-55. content. "Science" acted as an empty term, allowing the state to apply that label to different kinds of projects. Because of the elasticity of "science" in its multiple interactions with modern polities, it is important to pay close attention to the specifi c content and meaning of the science that particular nation-states and citizenries value. Thus, by "science" we refer to a broad scientifi c enterprise that takes on specifi c, local meanings attuned to national settings and circumstances. 13 Research on nationalism has largely ignored the nexus between science and national identity. In recent decades, scholars have lavished attention on the historical project of nation building, calling attention to its complexity and to the multifaceted relationships between nation-states and national citizenship. Scholars have been remarkably reticent about the place of science and technology in the construction of national identities, however. The articles presented here fi ll that gap. They address the coincidence between the emergence of modern, professional science and the nationstate both in the West and in postcolonial Asia, and they argue that chronological overlap was not happenstance but coproduction, an affi liation between science and the nation that went beyond funding streams and economic development to speak to national identity. The papers in this volume focus on different scientifi c enterprisesranging from natural history collecting to nanotechnology-but they all consider the ways in which a national public functioned as one of the intended audiences for scientifi c production. By inserting science into the formation of national identities, these authors address a signifi cant lacuna in an area of growing scholarly attention.
Nationalism and national identity have emerged as key categories of historical analysis in response to global political upheavals, leading scholars to interrogate the nation as history's obvious subject. In the late twentieth century, historians began dissecting the process of nation building, and they rejected the nation's claim to be a primordial form of social organization. The foundation of the process of nation formation, they discovered, was not the timeless unity of culture, ethnicity, language, and religion that allegedly constituted a nation. Rather, historians and social scientists maintained that the nation, no less than the nation-state, required political will and calculation. History itself as a discipline originated in the nineteenth century as part of the nation-building project, its purpose to provide the nation with its past. 14 Nations required efforts of construction, invention, and imagination rather than simply identifi cation; they were never already there waiting to enter history.
In the past forty years, scholarly disagreements have focused on the nature of the effort involved in producing a nation. In some research, nations feature as the product of elite inspiration and state planning; the patriotic masses arrive on the scene last, not fi rst. 15 Other scholars emphasize popular loyalties and demands, often generated by the discontents of the uneven distribution of the fruits of modern capitalism. 16 In some accounts, nations emerged out of the political processes of liberal revolutions 13 Dominique Pestre similarly details the multiple meanings that science takes on for different social actors in "Science, Political Power, and the State," in Pestre and Krige, Companion to Science (cit. n. 7), 61.
14 Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan, and Kevin Passmore, eds., Writing National Histories: Western Europe since 1800 (New York, 1999 (New York, 1985) . 16 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, N.Y, 1983) .
and debates about citizenship; while in others, nations were the result of industrialization and the imposition of bourgeois hegemony. For other scholars, looking for nationhood in deliberate action either from the top or from the bottom misses the point. Thus for Rogers Brubaker, post-Soviet nations are unplanned events, accidental and unexpected products of bureaucratic practices. 17 Similarly for Benedict Anderson, the nation is the result of print capitalism and an identity available for use either by elites or by disenfranchised groups. 18 For some researchers, nation is a purely modern form that replaces premodern forms of community, while for others, the nation derives its affective power from its affi nities with earlier ethnic or religious communities from which it derives its symbols and myths. 19 Counter to the claims of nationalists themselves, scholars emphasize that nations are anything but necessary and that nationalities are not essential human attributes, even though they are designed to appear as such. 20 The intense late-twentieth-century professional activity surrounding nations and nationalism shows no sign of abating. New peer-reviewed journals, Web sites, discussion lists, and conferences generate an ever-increasing quantity of international and interdisciplinary scholarship. 21 Greater volume, however, does not appear to bring this research any closer to questions about the relationship between scientifi c enterprise and the national project. Although nationalism scholarship has been catholic in its research methodologies and subjects, it has overlooked the extent to which an allegedly national capacity to excel in the production of science forms one of the affective bonds between states and citizens.
Recent work on nation formation has focused on how representations of the nation such as fl ags, vernacular languages, rituals, and ceremonies mediate the relationship between the nation-state and its people. This emphasis on the symbolic has not encouraged historians to include science and technology in the story of nation building. Nineteenth-century Germans, to take a well-researched example, forged their national identity from the celebration of rural homelands, Bach's genius, nature preservation, physical culture, female domesticity, and Christmas trees-symbols that gave "Germany" historical depth and a usable past. 22 This literature has been remarkably 17 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (New York, 1996) .
18 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Refl ections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (1983; repr., New York, 1991) .
19 Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (New York, 1986) ; John Hutchinson, Nations as Zones of Confl ict (Thousand Oaks, Calif., 2005) ; Adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism (New York, 1997); Anthony Marx, Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism (New York, 2003) . Cf. Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, Mass., 1992) . 20 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (cit. n. 16), 6. 21 For journals, see, e.g., Nationalities Papers (founded 1994), Nations and Nationalism (1995), Nationalism and Ethnic Politics (1995), National Identities (1999), and Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism (2000) . The Nationalism Project Web page (http: // www.nationalismproject.org) acts as a clearinghouse for relevant scholarship, listing conferences and providing links to the many associations dealing with nationalism. A search of the Nationalism Project site for "science" produces virtually no hits that refer to anything other than social science. 22 For a useful overview, see Nancy R. Reagin, "Recent Work on German National Identity: Regional? Imperial? Gendered? Imaginary?" Central European History 37 (2004) attentive to deconstructing the nation's claim to obviate other differences, and it focuses on the ways in which identifi cation with the nation articulates with other forms of identity such as race, gender, religion, ethnicity, and class. The citizen's ties to the nation fi nd symbolic form not only on explicitly political occasions such as national holidays but also in the texture of daily life, in the citizen-consumer's choice of products, the schoolchild's homework, and the nightly news. 23 An emphasis on the symbolic and the ritual is an important element of the scholarly project of deconstructing the primordial nature of the nation. Revealing national traditions-kilts, pumpkin pie, champagne-as invented is the central mode of a great deal of historical research on national identity. 24 In what has become a common historiographical operation, scholars take allegedly ancient symbols of national identity and expose their conscious fabrication and novelty. Symbols of great affect are revealed as the products of consumer capitalism. What remains of the fabric of national identity is essentially kitsch-empty symbols fi lled with the vapid sentimentality of nationalism.
The project of exposing invented traditions and reducing national symbols to kitsch discourages scholars from focusing on the kinds of icons of national identity that might lead to a discussion of science and technology. Mobilizing science in the construction of national identity proclaims novelty rather than concealing it and is essentially future oriented; a scientifi c icon of national achievement such as the space program is not subject to the same kind of deconstruction as pumpkin pie. In his account of cold war astronomy, W. Patrick McCray, for instance, undermines the heroic narrative of American professional scientifi c genius by emphasizing the role of amateur scientists and curious citizens, from ham radio enthusiasts to housewives. Taking apart the space program's claim to have built America as a technoscientifi c superpower does not, however, reduce rockets to consumer kitsch. 25 Scientifi c and technological icons have a material reality that resists their complete reduction to empty sentiment. The scientifi c, or at least engineering, principles behind artifacts such as the Autobahn and satellites continue to have a technological history even if their cultural meaning can be read as an instance of an invented tradition.
The infrastructure through which states build themselves is a good example of the polyvalent nature of the technological artifact. 26 The Erie Canal, for instance, is Thomas M. Lekan, Imagining the Nation in Nature: Landscape Preservation and German Identity, 1885 -1945 (Cambridge, Mass., 2004 ; Alon Confi no, The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871 -1918 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1997 Jean Quataert, Staging Philanthropy: Patriotic Women and the National Imagination in Dynastic Germany, 1813 -1916 (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2001 Alsace and Lorraine, 1850 -1940 (De Kalb, Ill., 1998 26 Peter Kroes, Anthonie Meijers, and other philosophers at the Delft University of Technology have explored the dual nature of technological artifacts, a concept through which they explore the ontological and epistemological relationships between artifacts' physical and functional defi nitions. See Peter simultaneously an engineering project, a political undertaking, and a national icon. Describing the coproduction of these elements is both extraordinarily diffi cult and, on the whole, not what most historians are trying to do. 27 Carol Sheriff's Artifi cial River discusses the Erie Canal's place in antebellum culture, exploring its symbolic meaning as an example of the young nation's ability to compress time and distance. The canal was a beacon of progress and ingenuity that also brought America's vices to rural New York, causing upstaters to question progress itself. Sheriff is primarily interested in the cultural work of nation building and is less attentive to engineering. 28 Jonathan Larson's Internal Improvement, by contrast, investigates the politics of infrastructure building and the canal's economic function, again with little attention to engineering. 29 Both historians are breaking with the "just-so story" of how the canal was built, a body of literature that focuses on the minutiae of canal engineering. 30 The Erie Canal could lend itself to a study of its coproduction as an engineering project, political undertaking, and national icon, but in both Sheriff and Larson's studies, the engineering project drops out.
In fact, the gap between the technological artifact and Sheriff and Larson's political and cultural treatments points to one of the tensions in the history of technology. On the one hand, cultural and political historians overlook the literally dirty business of making technologies. On the other, historians write the "internalist" history of technology as a just-so story about how things come into being, a simple narrative of invention or engineering in which the cultural and the symbolic play little role. Both accounts have serious fl aws, and the interaction of the state, science and technology, and citizens or the public falls into an interstice.
Recent research on maps and mapping further illustrates this mismatch between cultural and political histories of nationalism and the history of science and technology and suggests ways in which scientifi c production and national identity can illuminate one another without slighting the signifi cance of either. Benedict Anderson, drawing on Thongchai Winichakul's research, famously proposed the national map as an object of study. Anderson and Thongchai's argument, however, presents the map as logo rather than as a problem for scientifi c knowledge. According to Thongchai, "In terms of most communication theories and common sense, a map is a scientifi c abstraction of reality. A map merely represents something which already exists objectively 'there.' " The relationship between maps and their nations, however, upsets this common sense, because national maps "anticipated spatial reality, not vice versa. In other words, a map was a model for, rather than a model of, what it purported to represent." 31 The "map-as-logo" was "pure sign, no longer compass to the world." The map naturalized the bordered state, haven of the nation that resided within it. 32 symbolic resonance of the outline of national territory, but it effaces the role of science and technology in producing this image. In contrast, Matthew Edney's account of mapmaking includes the science of cartography in the production of the national image. 33 The shape of what became India was the result of engagement between the British Raj, British science, and Indian workers. Thongchai and Edney treat maps in fundamentally different ways. For Thongchai, maps are essentially tropes; the process by which landscape features are inscribed in two dimensions matters very little. In their most obviously logo form, they even border on kitsch-the nation with all its affective resonance captured in simple graphic form. Edney's account focuses on the production of cartographic images that come to represent the nation; indeed, Edney's history amounts to labor history, although the labor involved is scientifi c.
The Erie Canal and the making of the Indian map, like Nehru's institute and the revolutionary French meter, suggest that science has been present as a matter of national pride at the origins of many nation-states. Since the Enlightenment, nation-states have enlisted science as one of the bonds connecting citizens to the state. Science and engineering become "proof" that the nation can improve the living conditions of citizens, "proof" that the nation and its citizens are modern, and "proof" that they are economically and militarily competitive in a global world. 34 As a result, the capacity to produce science becomes an indicator of national superiority. Enlightenment western Europe distinguished itself from the irrational East just as in a later era the scientifi cally advanced North sees itself in opposition to a technologically defi cient South. Taken together, these ways of fashioning science have created a powerful alliance between science and the nation-state, a project in which scientists and engineers readily participate. This alliance is passed to the public to show the power of the state to beget development and improvement-often cast to show the superiority of one nation's science and technology over those of other nations.
Often, however, scholars who examine the relationship between the state and the scientifi c community abstract scientists from the broader body of citizens; interactions between governments and scientists thus appear to take place in a vacuum. These studies often emphasize the role of the state in the construction of scientifi c institutions, investigating state funding of science and the concomitant scientifi c lobbying for public resources. In studies of totalitarian states, this research tends to highlight the state's "abuse" or "perversion" of science, as in the cases of Nazi racial science or Lysenkoism. 35 Other studies focus on the state as a patron of scientifi c research, which may or may not involve a discussion of state manipulation of science 33 for ideological purposes. Invariably, these approaches demonstrate the importance of economic and military motives in state patronage of science. 36 To explore the role of science in nation-state building and identity formation, historians have to follow science and scientists out of the lab. Science cannot infl ect national identity unless it fi nds its way on to public agendas, either through the lobbying of scientists, the projects of the state, or the demands of citizen-consumers. The authors of these essays maintain that signifi cant discussions of science occur not only in laboratories or in political corridors of power but also in the "intellectual commons," a space where "multisided conversations about scientifi c topics take place . . . [in] which various publics can . . . seek to engage scientifi c professionals in conversation." 37 The "public" that matters to the authors of the essays in this collection is the nation.
Recent research on colonial science and science education offers models of how scholars might fi t science and scientists into the public. Although the literature on colonial science has extensively documented scientists' special role in the operations of the imperial state, recent research has uncovered the participation of colonial subjects in the process of making knowledge-a strategy that has the effect of integrating "science" into a broader community, in this case colonial society. 38 Science was "inextricably woven into the whole fabric of colonialism" because the authority of science and of the imperial state were mutually reinforcing. 39 New research emphasizes hybridity and co-option in the production of colonial science. As the civilizing mission deployed science and scientists to specify the nature of colonial otherness in its social, biological, and topographical forms, it created an intellectual commons that translated indigenous knowledge into the languages of state offi cials and Western scientists. This hybrid knowledge of the colonial world was not only a tool of imperial authority but also a potential basis for postcolonial national identity.
Research on educational systems similarly locates science within an intellectual commons-in this case a space defi ned in explicitly national terms. Educating citizens is one of the projects that modern states undertake, and the education of scientists, in particular, has been the domain of the nation-state. Education "serves as a crucible for reproducing cultural, political and moral values"; that is, students learn not only how to be good scientists but also how to be good subjects or citizens of the states that sponsor their training. 40 Like the essays in this collection, research on education examines the alignment between scientifi c and more broadly cultural values; educational institutions transmit both universal scientifi c knowledge and particular, local priorities. 41 The essays in this volume, like research on colonial science and scientifi c education, locate scientists within a public sphere. Science participates in forming national identity not because scientists talk to the public but because they speak within the public, as participants in a rational-critical discussion of the affairs of state. 42 Certainly, scientists' position within the body of citizens is privileged, in part because the value the state places on the utility of scientifi c knowledge gives them access to an effective soapbox. Recognizing the benefi ts of this privileged relationship with the state, scientists seek out the state's approval for their work, and this mutual benefi t pushes scientists, whether they intend it or not, into the public sphere.
Our focus on the interactions between science and the formation of national identity instantiated in the nation-state leads us to emphasize the modernity of the national project. The public sphere, the bureaucratized state, and modern science began to cohere in the eighteenth century. Although scholars with an interest in the signifi cance of ethnicity and the persistence of premodern forms of community have challenged the nation's modern chronology, we argue that the importance of science in defi ning the nation suggests the modernity of both. 43 Thus, the question of national identity as presented in this volume is essentially an issue for the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. The bulk of the essays in the collection focus on this period, exploring the relationship between the national and the scientifi c enterprise. Articles on protonational and postnational scientifi c projects bookend the collection, raising the possibility that science tracks both the rise and the fall of the national paradigm.
The volume opens with a study of protonational identity formation, Chandra Muk-erji's essay on the seventeenth-century construction of the Canal du Midi in the south of France. The notion of France as a "new Rome" engaged in engineering projects whose genius exceeded even that of the ancients fell short of being "national" in many ways-in particular, it excluded the peasant builders of the canal whose tacit engineering knowledge was vital to the success of the project. Although many of the pieces of the characteristic relationship between modern science and the state were in place in Louis XIV's engineering projects, they did not generate modern forms of national identity. In particular, contemporaries conceived of the canal as the product of the labor of royal subjects directed by individual engineering genius, not as an expression of the will and ability of French citizens. The next section turns to the emergence of modern nations and modern science in the West. Carol Harrison's contribution demonstrates the distance between Mukerji's hydraulic engineers of the seventeenth century and a fully formed national identity. Where the "new Romans" were autonomous aristocrats, the citizens, both sailors and scientists, who traveled on revolutionary France's expeditions to the south Pacifi c acted as representatives of the newly sovereign nation. Essays by Ann Johnson and Katherine Pandora use the case of the early United States to explore how a new nation-state generated identity among its citizens in the absence of an ancient lineage. Johnson examines the formation of an American engineering community to argue that scientists' confrontation with the variety and unfamiliarity of American nature led them to see American science-and American identity-as exceptional. Pandora similarly argues that American approaches to science contributed to convincing Americans of their exceptionality. The vernacular science of American children's literature produced scientifi c citizens; the boy and girl scientists of these stories represented America's capacity to democratize science and science's capacity to democratize America. Finally, Michael Gordin compares two late-emerging nations, Ireland and Russia. His paper examines the scientist as national icon, exploring why Dmitrii Mendeleev came to represent Russian national character while his contemporary, the equally distinguished Thomas Andrews, never acquired national signifi cance. In each of these papers, new nations deploy scientifi c competence as an attribute of emerging national character; in France and the United States, the association between the nation and scientifi c ingenuity established itself early on, while in imperial Russia and Ireland, the scientifi c character of the nation never achieved the same rhetorical potency.
The second major section of the book addresses science in mature Western states but in national contexts that challenge simple conceptions of national identity. Asif Siddiqi explores the postwar Soviet Union's failed attempt to incorporate German rocket scientists into a secret nationalist project. Siddiqi points to the tension of trying to take up German science while discarding the scientists and shows the necessity of that move in the context of articulating a cold war Soviet identity. Edward JonesImhotep also discusses postwar big science but on the other side of the cold war. Ionospheric research underscored place-dependent ideas of Canadian national identity. Canada was neither a linguistic nor an ethnic entity, and it was overshadowed by the superpower to the south, but its "northernness" became the defi ning element of its national identity in part because of the science that it allowed Canadians alone to carry out. Bruno J. Strasser argues that the defi nition of certain areas of international cooperation as "technical" rather than "political" allowed Switzerland to be both Western and neutral during the cold war. Swiss leadership in postwar scientifi c institutions such as CERN allowed them to accept participants from East and West, and this form of neutrality-the national space defi ned as an international meeting ground-became central to Swiss identity. The essays in this section remind us that the mutually reinforcing processes of scientifi c development and the formation of national identity remain active in the West well past the classic nineteenth-century "age of nation building."
Emerging postcolonial Asian countries similarly posited that science was indispensable and that the state and its citizens needed to collaborate in the project of creating the scientifi c nation. Contributions on Indonesia, India, and Republican China illustrate the intensity of this desire to deploy science in the project of identity formation as well as that of state building. The section opens with the late colonial period in Pratik Chakrabarti's essay on the development of medical research in India. Public health enjoyed prestige for its claim to utility, particularly its ability to protect the population from epidemic disease; it was therefore important to Indian nationalists that medical research should be Indian rather than British. The location of research laboratories became a point of contention in the early twentieth century, with nationalists insisting that facilities be moved away from colonial hill stations to locations that actually suffered from epidemics. Ross Bassett's paper on Indians trained at MIT also looks at science and technology as a tool of resistance to imperialism. By opting for American engineering education, young Indians chose an alternative version of modernity, one that, to their eyes, countered British imperialism. The experiences of these engineers in both the colonial and early national periods did not refl ect a division between Gandhian and Nehruvian visions of India, the former hostile to technology and the latter built on the mastery of Western science. Grace Y. Shen explores the consciousness of scientifi c inadequacy that featured in Chinese shame following the fall of the empire. Western-trained Chinese geologists argued that knowledge of the national territory was an indispensable step to reclaiming a sense of pride that in the new China would be national rather than ethnic or dynastic. Suzanne Moon considers technology transfer with her paper on the Krakatau steel company. Krakatau was supposed to spearhead the industrialization of Indonesia, and it symbolized the unity of the nation by referring to a precolonial, archipelagic empire. Locating the plant in a remote and impoverished region that had previously been the center of the Majapahit empire established the Sukarno government's commitment to social justice and the equitable distribution of wealth. Despite ideological differences between Sukarno and Suharto's New Order, the steel mill functioned for both as a representation of national identity. The papers on Asia make clear the extent to which nation building utilizes common building blocks, including steel plants, scientifi c societies, and infrastructure. Whether in Indonesia or in France, the nationalist's goal is to construct a nation that resembles and, therefore, can compete with other nations. Nations may have their own distinctive characteristics, but they resemble nothing so much as other nations.
Finally, the collection closes with Alfred Nordmann's essay on European Union emerging technology initiatives, a contribution that addresses the role of science in a potentially postnational world. Nordmann's essay highlights the irony of the persistence of a rhetoric of national scientifi c competitiveness in a transnational setting; his essay raises the possibility that science and technology may now be in the forefront of the creation of a postnational, global society. The European Union (EU) constructed its European Knowledge Society as a way to distinguish European re-search in the area of converging technologies from the American Nano-Bio-InfoCogno (NBIC) program. Although the two projects accomplished similar goals from a scientifi c perspective, the EU wanted to be sure it did so in an identifi ably European way; the initiative directed the familiar rhetoric of national scientifi c competitiveness toward the creation of a transnational identity.
Nordmann's paper gestures toward the uncertain status of the relationship of science and national identity in the contemporary world. On the one hand, recent scholarship on the nation suggests that its moment has passed and that its history was, ultimately, brief. In this literature, modern science and technology appear to be forces provoking the dissolution of nations. "Postnational" scholars build on Benedict Anderson's argument that nineteenth-century media-notably the novel and the newspaper-created the sense of imagined community among people unlikely ever to meet face to face. The contemporary heirs to modernity's print culture-the globalized media of the moving image and the Internet-fragment the nation and render it meaningless. 44 On the other hand, the nationalist voice persists in science policy: bureaucrats around the world continue to produce documents with titles such as Establishing Strong Korea in Science and Technology Human Resources and Rising above the Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America for a Brighter Economic Future. It is clear that science and nation often continue in tandem as they move toward the future; whether in that future the nation will prove dispensable remains to be seen.
The essays in the collection strike a balance between well-known examples and challenging and less familiar cases in both national and scientifi c terms. Many of the pieces focus on countries and periods for which there are well-developed literatures in both the history of science and national identity, for example, Enlightenment France, the Soviet Union, and India. A second group treats countries for which a robust scholarship concerning national identity formation exists but only a thin treatment of science and technology, such as the early American republic and Republican China. The third category contains cases that challenge ideas about the nation, such as Canada, Indonesia, and Switzerland, and about whose science little has been written.
The essays similarly range from treatment of paradigmatic cases of big science to little-known scientifi c developments. The collection includes classic cases of big science, such as Strasser's paper on CERN and Siddiqi's on rocketry. Harrison's essay proposes an eighteenth-century analogue for big science: voyages of exploration that mobilized massive scientifi c workforces and budgets. Nuclear physics, natural history, and missiles are well-trodden ground, although their connections to Swiss, French, and Soviet identity are less explored. In contrast, Johnson's paper on American engineering explores a largely unknown dimension of American science-materials research produced by the Corps of Engineers-while Pandora develops the neglected subject of vernacular science. Focusing on the nation opens the door to a wide range of fi elds across the physical and life sciences, engineering, and medicine because of the voracity of the nation-building project. Virtually anything can be used to build the nation.
Responding to Ernest Geller's claim that the "true subject of modern philosophy is industrialization," Tom Nairn asserted that "the true subject of modern philosophy is nationalism, not industrialization; the nation, not the steam engine or the computer." 45 Like Gellner, Nairn links nation and industrialization as the two key elements of modernity. Nonetheless, assigning the nation priority by placing it in opposition to the steam engine and the computer-defi ning technologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, respectively-is a telling rhetorical move. The authors of this volume propose alternatives to Nairn's depiction of the computer and the nation as either-or choices. The computer participates in the building of the nation, we maintain, and various nations around the world hold up their computer engineers as exemplars of national achievement. 46 If the nation is, as Ernest Renan famously claimed, "a daily plebiscite," then steam engines and computers and other icons of scientifi c progress and achievement are signifi cant reasons why citizens regularly vote in its favor; these artifacts represent citizens' belief in the benefi ts of a common national future. 47 Scholarship on the nation needs to be as attentive to nations' anticipated futures as to their imagined pasts. The nation that seeks to demonstrate its long unbroken connection to an illustrious past also endeavors to present itself as oriented toward a scientifi c future.
